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The dynamics of privatization in the Eastern Germany can be better un-
derstood in terms of the 'economic polities' applied to the 'political mar-
kets'. The Treuhandanstalt played a key role in transforming the entire
economy of the former GDR into the market economy in the wake of
unification of East Germany with West Germany. The present study dis-
cusses the agency's structure, functions and responsibilities, on the one
hand and financing, functioning and evaluation, on the other. Although
the Treuhandanstalt provides a unique example of privatization by the
state and the market, it cannot be duplicated or copied in toto (P 52).Acknowledgement
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Can the Treuhandanstalt Provide a Model?
The debate initiated around the neoliberal themes of privatization, de-
regulation, denationalization and destatization is based on the new politi-
cal economy — 'economic polities' applied to the 'political markets'. It
signifies political action in economic markets with a definite aim to
maximize profit and utility — the themes underlying neoclassical eco-
nomics. In the era of globalization and interdependence, we find a close
relationship between political philosophy and attitudes towards economic
relations. Although the interaction between the political and economic
aspects of the changing role of the state is often assumed, it is rarely
studied. In fact, two political legacies of the 1980s have influenced the
economic policies of the 1990s — (1) the renewed enthusiasm for pri-
vate enterprise and market economy and (2) rolling back the frontiers of
the state. It is now being held that 'it is none of the business of the gov-
ernment to remain in business'.
The spread of privatization all over the world in less than a decade is a
remarkable phenomenon in recent history. The waves of privatization
which swept the 'first world', so called 'second world' and 'the third world'
alike cannot be explained straightforward either in political or economic
terms. It can be seen as a part of the general rehabilitation of the market
forces as an intellectual disillusionment with the keynesian approach to
economic management and a failure of socialism as a serious intellec-
tual force. The 'ethics' of privatization is based upon the validity of the
private as opposed to the state property rights.
Privatization refers to the transfer of various activities from the realm of
public to the private sector. It can mean the sale of state owned-enter-prises either fully or in part. It can also mean a partnership between the
government and business through the transfer of responsibilities from
the public to the private. It can also imply the simple association of the
private with areas hitherto reserved exclusively for the public sector. It
covers a wide range of ideas and policies both in economic theory and
political practice. As such, it can mean different things to different peo-
ple.
In fact, the move towards privatization has been so diverse in forms and
varied in settings that the causes and consequences are unlikely to be
the same everywhere. If public ownership had diverse origins and de-
signs, privatization is bound to have diverse origins and designs too.
While faster growth, higher efficiency and wider competition have been
cited as the prime objectives of privatization in ideological terms, exter-
nal pressures and budgetary constraints have been the prime factors re-
sponsible for privatization in practical terms. Surprisingly, in the wake of
'de-ideological recasting
1 of the concept, a variety of measures have
sailed through the flag of privatization, ranging from 'divestiture' to 'con-
tract management'.
It is futile to locate the causes and consequences of privatization within a
state itself. Nor should it be seen as a simple matter of transferring pub-
lic assets and services to the private sector. We should not forget the
hard fact that the politicians can never afford to be market-dependent. In
the process of privatization debate, only the governments decide who
would enter or exit the market place and under what circumstances.
Prior to privatization, the role of the state was to protect the economy
from disruptive external forces. It is now required to adjust the domestic
economy to the external exigencies. This has led to 'domesticization of
international politics' and 'internationalization of domestic economies'. Ithas not only freed the domestic economies from state regulation but also
has exposed them to greater vulnerabilities both at the domestic and in-
ternational level.
The Context
The dynamics of privatization can be better understood in terms of the
international context. Although it is difficult to say whether privatization
constitutes the 'cause' or 'consequence' of globalization, one thing is
certain — it is the process of globalization which" has made privatization
imperative and desirable in more than a hundred countries in less than a
decade. Privatization in East Germany is also to be seen in a special
context — not only in the context of the unification of Federal Republic of
Germany with former German Democratic Republic, but also in the con-
text of Germany's keen desire to become a driving force in the European
unification process. Some look at it as the 'Europeanization of Germany
1,
while others look at it as 'Germanization of Europe
1.
The unification of Germany has not been an internal affair. It has cer-
tainly affected the unification of Europe as a whole and its economic
consequences have affected the rest of the world. The ease with which
the German unification swept away the political barriers sharply con-
trasts with the economic impediments and hardships. Approximately
DM 1000 bn of public funds have been channelled to the East Germany
till the end of 1996 since unification. In 1989, West Germany had the
world's biggest surplus. Since 1991, however, it has been a net importer
of resources. It is because of the excessive absorption of public and pri-
vate resources by the new landers. East German absorption doubled in
last six years and currently it is approximately 50% larger than the GDPof the East Germany. About one-third of excess absorption is met with
private capital imports into East German economy and two-third from
public transfers in the form of unemployment benefit, pensions and in-
vestments in public infra-structure.
The sum of the DM 1000 bn also includes parts of the loss of DM 270 bn
incurred by the Treuhandanstait in the process of privatization (the lion's
share was transferred to the Heritage Fund). Instead of raising
DM 600 bn, as anticipated prior to privatization, the privatization process
led to huge losses. Instead of pursuing the privatization policy on severe
economic grounds, the Treuhandanstait had to rely on a political strat-
egy. It had to pay a heavy price in terms of 'economic efficiency
1 to make
rapid privatization 'politically feasible
1.
The Treuhandanstait, popularly known as 'Troyhand' played a key role in
transforming the entire economy of the former GDR into the market
economy. During a short period of four and a half years since the Ger-
man unification and culmination of the Treuhandanstait (July 1, 1990 to
December 31, 1994), the THA was able to privatize fully or partially all
but 192 companies out of a total portfolio of 13,815 holdings, reprivatize
1,588 companies and communalize 265 companies. By communaliza-
tion, was implied the restoration of the SOEs and public assets to vari-
ous municipalities at the provincial level. At one stage, the THA became
the world's biggest holding company.
In the process of privatization of the THA companies, 2,983 'Manage-
ment Buy-Out
1 or "Management Buy-In
1 contracts were signed out of
which 2,081 contracts were administered by the THA branch offices and
902 by its headquarters. The THA was able to secure investment com-
mitments upto DM 211.1 bn and job commitments upto 1,508,000. It wasable to raise proceeds upto DM 66.6 bn and foreign investment to the
tune of DM 6.8 bn. The THA was also responsible for the privatization
and restitution of 30,000 small shops, restaurants, service firms,
2.3 million hectare of arable land and 1.9 million hectare of forest land
and the assets of former GDR political parties, mass organizations, army
and security forces.
The THA had to sail between a no man's land between politics and eco-
nomics. Devoid of a blue print to follow, it became an instrument of in-
dustrial policies itself. Since fetching the highest price was not the chief
goal of the THA, it had a lot of scope for manoeuvring and subjective
judgement which gave it the image of an 'omniscient agency'. It was
commonly criticised for being bureaucratic and secrative. Its primary in-
terest was in the continuation of business. There were some instances
of favouritism, financial irregularities and miscalculations, but they were
unavoidable in the situation of rapid privatization on a massive scale.
The THA is survived by the Bundesanstalt fur Vereinigungsbedingte
Sonderaufgaben, more popularly known as the BVS. Although the BVS
wanted to disappear by January 1, 1998, the new landers wanted it to
continue for an indefinite period of time. The decision has now been
taken towards the continuation of the BVS beyond the year 2000, of
course, it is a political decision which cannot be supported in terms of
market economy. Despite the weaker economic position in comparison
to West Germany, the new landers are able to put political pressure on
the coalition government at the federal level. The whole concept of 1:1
conversion rate for current transactions (wages, pensions, interests,
etc.) and 2:1 for debts and liabilities has to be understood in terms of
federal dynamics.The BVS is responsible for controlling and re-negotiating the contracts
made by the THA. The new landers wanted BVS to continue because of
the latter's sound financial condition. By February 1995, the BVS had
concluded 2,500 contracts out of a total of 3,000 re-negotiations regis-
tered. More and more investors are likely to ask for the re-negotiations
on one ground or another. According to a survey conducted in August
1996 on 2,500 manufacturing firms by the Deutsches Institut fur Wirt-
schaftsforschung (DIW) at Berlin, 24% East German enterprises wanted
to re-negotiate with the BVS on grounds of "purchase price
1, 14% on
grounds of 'old financial debts', 12% on grounds of 'financial aid
1, 12% on
grounds of contract conditions with regard to 'job commitments' and 12%
on grounds of 'investment commitments', 8% on grounds of 'liability for
pollution of the soil
1, 5% on grounds of restitution claims and 29% on
miscellaneous other grounds. The privatization in East Germany seems
to be an 'unending story'.
A Review
Today, while the West Germans lament the massive costs incurred on
privatization in the East Germany in the wake of unification, the East
Germans also complain of deindustrialization, mounting unemployment
and cutbacks in social welfare. While the entrepreneurs in the West
hoped to take advantage of the East Germany's networks and especial
position in the COMECON, the East Germans hoped to achieve the
matching living standards almost automatically. Even before the unifica-
tion, the industrial productivity of East Germany was estimated to be just
30-40 percent of that of the West.It was essential to privatize the whole economy of the East Germany to
bail it out of the serious economic crisis. Even the success of the political
decisions of the reunification of East Germany with West Germany de-
pended upon the successful transfer of the basic institutions to the mar-
ket economy and liberal democracy. The government's privatization
strategy was based on the assumption that, if given an opportunity, the
West German companies, with expertise in management and access to
finances, would be willing to buy the East German firms and turn them
into competitive enterprises at the global level. The government ex-
pected to achieve economic miracles through huge flows of investment
from the Western enterprises to the Eastern ones, raising the productiv-
ity to high levels, thereby.
It was hoped that the West German companies would commit them-
selves to major investments in the new landers either in the form of
'greenfield investments' or through the 'purchase of the East German
enterprises', in order to reap the benefits of cultural affinity and available
skilled workforce at cheaper rates in East Germany and automatic ac-
cess to Eastern and central European markets through East German
networks. East Germany had almost 50% share in the COMECON trad-
ing system. However, these hopes could not materialize. With the col-
lapse of COMECON, deep recession in Eastern and Central Europe and
disintegration of former USSR, the value of East German contacts was
lost.
It affected adversely the Western companies' investment in East Ger-
many. In order to promote investment and privatization in East Germany,
the federal government adopted two measures — (1) investment grants
and tax allowances were made available to reduce the costs of an in-
vestment project upto 50% and (2) subsidies could be provided in con-8
junction with the privatization of the SOEs in East Germany by the Treu-
handanstalt. The task of privatization was assigned to a fiduciary agency
— the Treuhandanstalt. Its job was not only to sell the state owned
enterprises and property in East Germany but also to buy investors and
secure jobs. Besides economic, it had many social obligations to fulfil. It
was 'a challenge impossible
1.
The Agency
The term 'Treuhand' in the German language means a 'trustee'. The
Treuhandanstalt was a state trustee agency which was responsible for
the privatization of the state-owned property of the former GDR. It was
founded on March 1, 1990 still under the last communist government of
Dr. Hans Modrow. The objective of the Modrow government was to res-
cue the old economic system rather than to transform it.
The industry in the former GDR was concentrated into 157 Kombinates
— huge state trusts. Under the Modrow government, the privatization
agency was required to play the role of a 'raider'. It was required to break
up the Kombinate into pieces that could become viable. It could also re-
combine the units. It was responsible for evaluating what could be
privatized and what needed restructuring and liquidating. When the
freely elected GDR government came into power under the prime
minister Dr. Lothar de Maiziere, the coalition agreement went into the
detailed legislation on the tasks and working methods of the THA. The
law stated that the new THA would continue with the original task of
breaking the Kombinate and converting them into legal entities. The
prime aim was to convert the state property into the property of private
persons and well-justified cases into the property of regional authorities.The Treaty creating 'Monetary, Economic and Social Union
1 between the
East and West Germany took privatization for granted. On May 17,
1990, the Federal Chancellor's office and the Federal Ministry of Eco-
nomic Affairs presented the 'Bonn plan' for the Treuhand Act. They en-
visaged three different organizations to deal with commercial assets,
residential property and agriculture. The legal form envisaged was an
Aktiengesellschaft (AG) — a joint stock company on the pattern of AGs
in the West Germany. The AGs were found to be more autonomous and
flexible for being based on the principles of separation of business and
government, on the one hand, and codetermination with equal represen-
tation from both sides of the industry, on the other. The Treuhand was
not designed to become an entrepreneur itself. As such, its managers
did not sit on the Board of Directors of the Companies to be privatized.
A new law defining the tasks and responsibilities of the THA came into
force on June 17, 1990. This law emphasised privatization in East Ger-
many. After the unification on July 1, 1990, the THA was subordinated to
the FRG Ministry of Finance. The agency was set up in former Hermann
Goring's Luftwaffe building at Berlin. It had no blueprint or precedent to
follow. The number of employees of the THA increased from a mere 600
in its early days to more than 2,500 by the summer 1991. In August
1990, Detlev Rohwedder became its first president. After he was assas-
sinated in April 1991, Birgit Breuel became the president of Treuhand.
She provided able leadership to the THA till December 31, 1994.
The Structure
Although the THA was a statutory body, it functioned more like an in-
vestment bank rather than a centralized agency. It was relatively inde-10
pendent of Bonn and had an economic and business-like orientation.
The agency was allowed within certain limits to run its own debt and its
budget. It was not directly controlled by the German parliament but only
by the Federal Court of Audit. Although it enjoyed the status of an insti-
tution under public law under the Act of Privatization and Reorganization
of State Property, yet it was organizationally a separate part of the fed-
eral administration within the meaning of Article 86 and 87 of the Ger-
man constitution — the Grundgesetz.
The original THA was headed by a directorate. It was composed of the
President and four other members. They were appointed by the Adminis-
trative Board for a period of 5 years. They could be dismissed earlier on
serious grounds. They were not bound by the instructions given to them.
The Executive Board was required to submit annual report and accounts
to the Administrative Board. It exercised supervision over the activities of
the THA. The president of the THA was supposed to keep the Chairman
of the Administrative Board informed of all important business matters.
Decisions of particular significance also required the assent of the Ad-
ministrative Board. It included the preparation of the business plan,
drawing of funds from the capital market, establishment of companies,
restructuring, privatization and liquidation.
The original THA under the Modrow government was to function on the
basis of territorial decentralization. It led to the setting up of the head-
quarters at Berlin and administrative centres at 14 East German cities,
each responsible for a separate region. These were authorized to take
decisions on their own with regard to privatization of small and medium-
sized companies. The so-called Beirate advisory boards helped in
maintaining contacts with the business, political and social forces within11
the region. The THA established excellent networks during the course of
its tenure. Without formal and informal networks it could not have suc-
ceeded in its mission.
The Treuhand had a matrix organization divided into nine executive
boards on the basis of functional responsibilities, such as administration,
financing operating responsibilities, etc. The headquarters at Berlin were
responsible for the enterprises with more than 1,500 employees and for
the firms in the sectors of energy, transport, banking and credit. The rest
of the companies were dealt by the regional subsidiaries. In terms of or-
ganizational law, the branches were supposed to be subordinate and
dependent parts of the institute under public law but, in fact, they proved
to be a lower-tier of authority. The THA Executive Board had assigned
certain tasks to them to carry out at their own responsibility and there
was no possibility of contesting their decisions at the central office. The
THA retained the branches as decentralized business divisions by hav-
ing recourse to the internal organizational power of the Executive Board
and its authority to issue orders. It recruited staff for itself and other
subsidiaries independently.
The Functions and Responsibilities
The functions and responsibilities of the THA varied from time to time,
depending upon the prevailing economic and political situation. The
original THA was responsible for converting the state-owned Kombinates
and other organizations into joint stock companies. Its task was to exer-
cise trusteeship over the public property. It was not the owner of the
state property de jure. Yet it was the holder of people's property for all
practical purposes. It served the purpose of retaining peoples property12
as a central agency for the time being. Although it was not directly re-
sponsible for privatization, it was authorized to resort to privatization on a
limited scale. Some parties from within East Germany were able to ac-
quire shares, buildings or machinery from state-owned companies
through the original THA to establish or enlarge private business, having
the mittelstand character (small to medium size).
The THG (The Act for Privatization and Re-organization of State Prop-
erty) of June 17, 1990, dissolved-the Resolution of Establishment and
statutes of the original THA. It also abolished the existing responsibilities
of the THA with effect from July 1, 1990. Instead, the statutes of the THA
dated July 18, 1990, formulated new tasks and responsibilities for the
THA. The Rules of Procedures dated September 18, 1990 further sup-
plemented and expanded these responsibilities. The privatization be-
came the main responsibility of the THA under the first sub-clause of the
Preamble and Section 1, Sentence 1 of the THG. The responsibility of
carrying out privatization was laid on the THA by Article 1, Section B of
the THG and Article 25, Section 1, Sentence 1 of the Treaty of Unifica-
tion. The THA was held responsible for transferring the public assets
entrusted to it to private legal entities or natural persons as rapidly as
possible and as far as possible. However, 'restitution' and 'communaliza-
tion
1 were excluded from the definition of privatization.
On July 1, 1990, the THA had assumed the responsibility for approxi-
mately 8,500 state-owned enterprises with a total strength of four million
employees. It required a great deal of 'political sagacity' and 'economic
expertise
1 on the part of the THA to resolve the dilemma — it was re-
quired to reshape, reform and restructure the entire economy of the for-Instituts for Weiiwirfseh^ft 13
mer GDR, on the one hand, and preserve the social market economy
and jobs, on the other.
Many of these enterprises operated in various branches which had been
'arbitrarily amalgamated
1 under the centrally planned economy of the
former GDR. For instance, in some cases, production facilities for tools
and lemonade, kindergartens, hospitals, hotels and various other social
organizations were grouped together in one single holding company. It
had a destructive effect as far as any 'potential synergy was concerned
1.
These Kombinates had to be decartelized to enable the new units to
survive in the market economy. It was important to introduce market
mechanism into the state-owned holdings to make them adapt to the
structures of the free market economy. The ultimate objective of privati-
zation was to restructure the obsolete centrally controlled economy of
the former GDR into functioning market economy. According to the ex-
president of the THA, Dr. Rohwedder, the task of the THA was to privat-
ize rapidly, where that was not possible in the short term, to restructure
with determination and liquidate considerably, where neither of these
options was available.
The THA worked on the maxim — have as little government as possible
and as much government as necessary. It was also responsible for
creating small and medium-sized economic units in order to make them
saleable and competitive. As such, it got involved in the process of
'creative destruction' of state-owned holding enterprises into smaller
units to make them saleable and economically viable and efficient. The
challenge before the THA was to create units which were small enough
to be saleable and large enough to be able to function independently. It
had three objectives in mind before dismantling:14
(i) to make the enterprises competitive
(ii) to create transparency in order to enable appropriate reviews and
inspections to be carried out
(iii) to change management attitudes of the enterprises.
According to the lady President, Birgit Breuel, the THA's task was not
only to sell the state-owned holdings but also to buy investors for the
same. The key objective in restructuring companies, both during and af-
ter decartelization, was to find the 'right' buyers to make the companies
economically viable and competitive. The job of the government through
the THA was to create the political, legal and financial framework to sup-
port and create the viable economic and industrial units. It required a
great deal of time, effort and creativity on the part of the THA. The work
of the THA was, in fact, that of 'crisis management'. It is still controver-
sial whether the THA should have given priority to restructuring over pri-
vatization. Many economists have argued that restructuring should have
been left to the new investors. But it became quite apparent that most of
the enterprises could not be sold without prior restructuring.
Prior to privatization, East German industry was dominated by combines
(VEBs). 15% of employment was in firms having more than
1,000 people. The THA had to break them into smaller units to make
them saleable. It had to recombine them wherever necessary. The sole
decision on what to privatize and how to privatize rested upon the THA.
The hierarchy comprised the Board of Directors (Aufsichtsrat), Adminis-
trative Board (Verwaltungsrat) and Executive Board (Vorstand). The
most influential among them was the Administrative Board which was re-
sponsible for evaluating the chances of survival of an enterprise in the15
competitive market economy. If it found a company not fit for survival, its
task was to close it down under 'silent' or 'formal liquidation' or 'bank-
ruptcy proceedings'. It was also responsible for 'creating and preserving
jobs'. As such, the THA had conflicting aims and objects since its incep-
tion.
Besides these formidable tasks, the THA was required to carry out pri-
vatization to the extent to which the assets entrusted to it were affected,
although formally this task was allotted to the property offices (Ver-
mogensamter) under the Property Act of August 1992. It decided by
means of an administrative act, on the sale, letting, leasing of land,
buildings, etc. It was also involved in settling the restitution claims on
properties under its possession. Under the Treaty of Unification, the as-
sets of political parties and their affiliated organizations, legal entities
and mass organizations were to be returned to their 'previous' and
'rightful ownership
1. The THA was also responsible for the financing of
the Loan Winding-up Fund and the State Insurance of East Germany.
The President of the THA was required to certify that the statutory as-
signment of basic property to joint stock companies were carried out by
means of an administrative act.
Financing
When the original THA was set up, it was presumed that it would gener-
ate enough funds for itself through privatization proceeds and liquidation
of companies entrusted to it. Under Article 21, Section 1, Sentence 2 of
the Monetary, Economic and Social Treaty, the THA was authorized to
enter into debts upto DM 17 bn during 1990-91. Later, the credit limit
was raised to DM 25 bn and these debts were supposed to be paid off16
by December 31, 1995. The Federal Ministry of Finance was authorized
to prolong the period of loans and/or extend the credit limits in the event
of major change in the general conditions. Gradually, the THA was al-
lowed a credit limit of DM 36 bn each financial year and an additional
DM 8 bn, with the permission of the Federal Ministry of Finance under
the THA Credit Act of July 3, 1992.
The THA Credit Act made it easier for the THA to raise credit on the
capital market without any prior audit. It was considered a special asset
of the federal government in financial terms. But unlike other special as-
sets, the federal government owed the legal liability for the THA obliga-
tions. As such, the THA functioned on the basis of a soft budget. The
THA was supposed to raise approximately DM 600 bn from the sale of
companies (to be used for the upliftment of East Germans), but it left a
debt of DM 270 bn when it closed its doors on December 31, 1994. The
Treuhand's reluctance to liquidate companies and subsequent subsidies
to keep the loss-making companies afloat in order to preserve jobs for
the time being proved to be very costly.
For instance, the THA subsidized investments in shipyards at a rate of
DM 1,000,000, more than the cost of sacking a worker. Investment to
the Baltic Sea Shipyard totalled more than DM 2 bn. Other examples in-
clude DM 800 million for the EKO Stahl steel plant in Brandenburg and
approximately DM 2 bn for the Zeiss optical plant in Thuringia. The EKO
Stahl had everything going against it. When the Berlin wall fell — the
products were of poor quality, the European markets were saturated — it
employed 12,000 workers and was losing tons of money. It was a prime
candidate for liquidation, but the THA decided that the plant should stay
and Eisenhuttenstadt should also continue as a steel town.17
The THA had the tendency to save the biggest and not necessarily the
best companies in order to save jobs. It had conflicting goals to fulfil and
had to work under socio-political constraints. The decision to subsidize
jobs in EKO Stahl, e.g. was designed to preserve the stability of the re-
gion concerned. The role of the BVS is now under question in the case
of Bremer Vulkan — the largest ship building company in Germany. Its
Chairman, Mr. Friedrich Hennemann, was charged of divesting public
funds to the tune of DM 716 bn (meant for East German shipyard) to the
parent company in West Germany. The THA had sold three East Ger-
man shipyards to Mr. Hennemann in 1992 despite misgivings by the
THA officials and bankers. It is difficult to justify enormous subsidies to
companies like which have no chances of a turn-around.
Supervision
We should not forget that the THA had to function under the supervision
of not only its own Administrative Board but also under external supervi-
sion. It had various internal control mechanisms similar to those within a
company in the private sector. The original THA reported to the govern-
ment. After the THG came into force, the Executive Board of the THA
had to report regularly on the progress of privatization to the Council of
Ministers. The THA had to take the approval of the Federal Minister of
Finance before finalizing the cases for privatization.
As an institute under the public law, the THA was subject to control by
the parliament through the monitoring instruments of formal questions
and informal requests for information. The Federal Court of Audit also
exercised significant control over the activities of the THA. The parlia-
ment set up an independent committee on THA with 24 members. The18
use of a Committee of Enquiry gave enormous powers to the parliament
to investigate special cases. It was possible for the Bundestag and the
BundesratXo be informed of any matter of public importance any time.
The East German states also exercised considerable influence through
their representatives on the Administrative Board of the THA and its Ad-
visory Boards at the regional level. The function of the THA Economic
Cabinets was to coordinate the work of the THA and the concerned state
government, especially with regard to the labour market. Since the East
German states joined the FRG, they became subject to direct control
and supervision of the Bundesrat. The federal government was under an
obligation to report in detail the THA activities every six months to the
Commission of the European Community. The Commission could exam-
ine individual cases in sensitive areas, such as steel, shipbuilding, auto-
mobiles, manufacturing, chemical, etc.
The civil courts are responsible for examining the THA decisions with re-
gard to privatization and dealings in companies in which it held equity.
The restructuring programmes come under administrative courts. Parties
affected by the THA's decisions on investment priority or assignment of
property can also make appeal to the administrative law. The adminis-
trative courts can also be approached in the case of disputes among the
THA, political parties or mass organizations with regard to public assets
under control of the THA. It is still a matter of debate whether the civil
courts are competent to examine the decisions made by the THA. Since
the THA exercised co-determination and supervisory powers over the
companies in which it held equity, it was subject to civil law. As such, it
was under the control of civil courts. There are still many cases pending
before the civil courts concerning privatization and liquidation carried out
by the THA.19
The Functioning of the THA
The THA resorted to various instruments and methods depending upon
the size of the company and the industry in which it operated. In many
cases, it had to opt for a combination of various methods and instru-
ments. It had no fixed criteria or blueprint, it started the process from the
scratch and adopted case by case approach. The lady president Birgit
Breuel supported flexibility on the part of the THA to avoid unnecessary
delay and red tapism during the privatization process. It aimed at finding
commercially active business owners as quickly as possible. It had to
tailor-make different strategies at different times according to the market
conditions prevailing at that particular time. As such, it had to rely on
formal and informal networks. It had plenty of scope for manoeuvring
needed to carry out its tasks — a complex bundle, ranging from selling
the state-owned enterprises and assets, buying investors, preserving
and creating jobs to realization of proceeds.
Although there was no hierarchical relationship among the various aims,
the THA had set its own guidelines on the basis of experience gained
through learning by doing. It gave priority to a privatization that could be
carried out quickly. Its endeavour was to sell the company as a whole, if
possible. Otherwise, it aimed at partial privatization. It pursued a strategy
which not only concentrated on the goals but on the means as well. It
tried to preserve as many jobs as possible in order to avoid serious un-
employment problems at the regional level. It did not follow the privatiza-
tion rules strictly and kept its options open. Instead of generating maxi-
mum proceeds through privatization, it gave priority to the survival of the
company at its location. As such, it gave priority to the investor who was20
likely to continue the business operation with a reasonable hope of suc-
cess to the highest bidder.
Usually, two methods are adopted for selling the companies or part of
them — (1) the auction method and (2) the bargaining method. The auc-
tion method can lead to rapid privatization on transparent grounds, but
does not guarantee sufficient competition among the bidders. The bar-
gaining method, on the other hand, ensures greater degree of freedom
and flexibility for both the negotiating parties, but it provides little trans-
parency and is often found to be time consuming. While auction method
is recommended for mass privatization, the bargaining method can be
more useful when there are only a few bidders or suitable buyers. The
bargaining method also helps in finding the 'right buyers' and not simply
'any buyer'.
The THA negotiated with interested parties without following any formal
procedure. Although this procedure did not guarantee equality of oppor-
tunity to all potential investors, the THA found it useful because it could
discuss the various stages of privatization, unbundling, initial restructur-
ing, contract drafting and final sales, simultaneously, quickly and effi-
ciently. The THA resorted to 'limited tender
1 in the cases of small or me-
dium-sized companies and public tender for mass privatization. The lim-
ited tender was a formal procedure in which the THA laid down a number
of conditions subject to further negotiations. The THA used public tender
only twice — once for the mass privatization of more than 30,000 retail
shops in January 1991 and the second time when larger items came for
sale later. It did not resort either to public auction or floating of shares.
The THA was actively involved in the preparation, execution and moni-
toring of the privatization process. During the preparatory stage, it was21
concerned with the creation of saleable units by unbundling or merging,
valuation of assets and liabilities, assessment of company's suitability for
restructuring, exploring the markets and initiating negotiations with the
potential buyers. In the second stage, the stress was on the actual sale
negotiations. The THA first checked the investors' credit ratings and
viability of their corporate strategies. If satisfied, it negotiated in detail on
future investments and jobs to be preserved with the individual bidders.
It also had to take care of the environmental and other liabilities before
finalizing the purchase price. Some of the companies had negative value
and some of them were sold just for the token value of DM 1. Even after
privatization, the THA's job was not over. It had to supervise and monitor
the contracts and re-negotiate whenever necessary.
Privatization through MBO/MBI/Management KGs
Since the East Germans lacked access to finance, management exper-
tise and western markets, they could not participate in the privatization
process effectively. They put pressure for privatization from below. The
initiative came from the Eastern managers themselves. Initially, the THA
had no scheme for Management Buy-Out or Management Buy-In. Only
in autumn 1992, the THA established a fund to provide the MBOs ac-
cess to consultancy advice. The idea had emerged at Berlin regional
subsidiary level earlier.
In order to give the East German managers a chance to continue man-
aging their companies under the market economy, the THA set up a
policy known as Initiative Mittelstand. It aimed at providing the managers
of small and medium-sized companies an opportunity to carry out man-
agement buy-outs. It also developed a programme to help them finance22
the purchases, knowing fully well that the East Germans had no chance
of saving money under the communist system. Vouchers did not find fa-
vour with the THA mainly because they neither bought fresh money nor
new technology. Moreover, because of the high wage costs, lack of mar-
kets and bad shape of outdated plants, the East German firms could not
yield profits. Nobody would have invested in a company with a negative
value.
The Initiative Mittelstand proved very successful. Approximately 18% of
the medium-sized enterprises were sold to incumbent or external man-
agement. It meant that approximately one-fifth of the THA firms were
purchased by the East German managers and employees. Nearly 50%
of the MBOs were in industry, 25% in service, 13.3% in construction and
11.4% in trade. Approximately 60% of the firms had less than 50 em-
ployees, 35% had between 50-250 employees and 5% had more than
250 employees. The average size was approximately 70. Approximately
66% of the firms were purchased by their managers (pure MBOs), 15%
by their managers and employees (MEBOs), 15% by East and West
German managers jointly (BIMBOs) and 4% by the Management Buy-Ins
(MBIs) and 'pure' Employee Buy-Outs (EMBOs).
Through the MBI scheme, the THA tried to attract the individual entre-
preneurs to establish business in East Germany. It launched this
scheme in 1992. The advertizing campaign elicited 2,800 responses.
The applicants were shortlisted on the basis of the following criteria :
(i) availability of at least two annual salaries as start up finance
(ii) managerial experience
(iii) a track record in the industry23
(iv) a willingness to resettle in East Germany
The THA selected 400 candidates after a thorough screening and identi-
fied approximately 3,000 firms as suitable. The candidates were put in
contact with West German and Foreign Venture Capital Funds in order
to secure participation by the financial institutions. The Deutsche Bank,
e.g., established an industrial holding company in 1991 —the Deutsche
Industrial Holding. Its objective was to secure 100 percent holding of the
THA firms. By July 1993, it purchased 13 of the THA firms guaranteeing
3,500 jobs and investment upto DM 150 million.-The other private sector
investment funds included the Ermgassen Fund, EGIT and Robert
Flemings of London.
In spring 1992, the THA launched a new scheme of the Management
KGs to introduce market driven incentives into the restructuring and pri-
vatization process while retaining the ownership with the THA. This new
strategy became necessary when the THA found that even the poten-
tially viable enterprises had failed to attract new buyers. It tried to buy
time for these enterprises to prove their viability. The advantage of this
approach was that the regional and external effects could be taken into
account. The THA was required to monitor the employment and invest-
ment contracts and had to maintain contacts with the former enterprises
till the full duration of the contracts.
An Evaluation
Any evaluation of the THA can only be made on the basis of a 'compre-
hensive analysis', covering the basic objectives, processes and results
of privatization in East Germany. Although the THA was responsible for
'spontaneous privatization
1 wherever feasible, making other enterprises24
viable after restructuring and liquidating the non-viable enterprises in or-
der to transform the East German economy from the socialist to the
market oriented economy, it became clear soon that this programme
was 'too demanding
1 for any privatization agency. Although THA was
designed to function in an autonomous manner, it could not be insulated
from political pressures, regional politics and bureaucratic red-tapism. It
had to function under the circumstances beyond its control.
Right from its inception, it had conflicting goals to perform. It was re-
quired not only to transform the ownership patterns, but also to secure
jobs. For every privatization, it had at least one more alternative. It could
have sold a company to another bidder, or could have kept it for a longer
period of time or could have liquidated it straight away. Restructuring of
the non-viable enterprises by the THA caused a lot of controversy. Re-
structuring meant preparing the enterprise from privatization through
various activities, such as, breaking up the large conglomerates into vi-
able units, dismissal of former managers lacking entrepreneurial skills,
reduction in the work force and making huge investments in the firms to
make them more attractive to the private purchasers. While one group of
scholars found restructuring by the THA as futile on theoretical grounds,
other group supported it on pragmatic grounds.
As a fudiciary, THA had the advantage of having the requisite networks
with other government agencies. It could also exert political pressure to
modify the laws that inhibited the restructuring of the firms. It could also
wait till the necessary infrastructure had been set up. It could enjoy the
'economies of scale' and 'wider scope', on the one hand, and could also
pool the risks involved in restructuring such, as restitution claims, envi-
ronmental damage costs and unforeseen demand developments, on the25
other. But in practice, restructuring was often used as a label to disguise
subsidization of non-viable firms under political or regional pressures.
Although the THA tried its best to resist political pressures, it had to
function under several constraints. It could not resort to liquidation of
non-viable enterprises under political or regional pressures. It had no
weapons to fight against undue political pressures. It was in a weak po-
sition even towards the potential buyers. Once it was known that a par-
ticular state-owned enterprise could not be liquidated, potential buyers
tried to press for even lower prices. Often the THA had to sell the non-
viable enterprises at a negative price in order to ensure job-commit-
ments or investment commitments. Large subsidies had to be provided
towards the end of the privatization programme where liquidation was
not politically feasible. Large SOEs often found political support against
liquidation.
Not adept in public relations, the THA decisions were generally misun-
derstood by the public. The whole process of privatization was beyond
the understanding of an average German citizen. The West Germans
were used to seeing their economy always grow without knowing why
and the East Germans could not digest the idea of selling a huge enter-
prise for a token price of DM 1 only. Politicians and trade unions were
able to reap benefits out of such precarious situations. In many cases,
the THA had to postpone the resolution of liquidation under abrupt politi-
cal intervention. For instance, in Saxony, the liquidation of the steel
manufacturing company in Freital had to be prevented through the inter-
vention of the Prime Minister of Saxony. Similarly, the Chemical Indus-
tries in Leuna and the Optical Industries in Jena were saved on political
assurance.26
Privatization has always been unpopular with the politicians and the vot-
ers since they are more concerned with the distributional aspects rather
than the macro-economic aspects of economy. In the case of East Ger-
many, privatization gave too high hopes to the public which could not be
realised in a short term. Many expectations and calculations went wrong
and the THA was made the scapegoat for the recklessly optimistic poli-
cies of the West German politicians. They could not anticipate the sud-
den collapse of the East German economy. There were five factors re-
sponsible for it:
(1) the conversion rate of 1:1 for all current transactions,
(2) unrealistic wage increases,
(3) poor quality of goods produced,
(4) collapse of major export market in Eastern Europe,
(5) economic recession in western Europe.
Owing to the exchange rates of 1:1 (in lieu of the actual rate of 1:3), the
East German firms could not afford supplies from West German or for-
eign firms, while the East German consumers discarded Eastern goods
all of a sudden. In the process of revaluation, the East Germany's capital
stock economically halved overnight. Perhaps the biggest blunder was
made when wage contracts were signed to match the wage levels in the
East with those of the West by 1994 without raising the actual productiv-
ity. It was a political and not an economic agreement between the Ge-
samtmetall (the West German Metal Employer's Association) and IG
Metall (the West German Trade Union of Metal Workers). The wages for
the east were de facto fixed by the west. Although the wages were about
70% of West German levels in February 1993, the productivity was 50%27
below that of West German levels, especially in the area of steel, engi-
neering and electrical sectors.
The lack of correlation between the wages and productivity made the in-
vestors more apprehensive. For instance, in November 1992, Daimler-
Benz cancelled his plan of building truck factory near Berlin with an in-
vestment of DM 1 bn. Krupp, the large German steel manufacturer,
abandoned his plan to takeover the EKO Stahl. Besides there was less
demand for East German products owing to their poor quality. With the
fall of COMECON, the trade with Eastern Europe suffered since these
countries were not in a position to pay for East German goods in DM.
The East German factories could not compete with the Western markets
on technological grounds.
Moreover, Germany was hit by an economic recession — worst since
1974/75. It had significant effect on the privatization efforts by the THA.
Many investors backed off and many deals had to be cancelled. It de-
layed the whole process of privatization. The THA had to keep the loss-
making and unviable firms under its fold for longer period of time than
anticipated, raising the cost tremendously thereby. The West Germans,
used to very good economic and living standards, started questioning
the very necessity of complete and rapid privatization in the wake of uni-
fication. The East Germans, were also unprepared for price rise, loss of
jobs and other socio-cultural problems. All the blame for economic hard-
ships was put on 'unification' in general and 'privatization' in particular.
The false promises by the shrewd politicians left many psychological
scars on the public mind.
The welfare effects of privatization in East Germany have been high on
the political agenda now. It is difficult to evaluate the impact of distribu-28
tion of income, knowledge and wealth between the West and East Ger-
many both from theoretical and empirical point of view. In the case of
East Germany, the idea of voucher or people's capitalism did not find fa-
vour with the politicians. It was difficult to determine the citizenship of
East Germany. It was difficult to decide whether vouchers or shares be
given to those GDR citizens who left it prior to unification or not. Also, in
the Treaty on German Unification, people's property became extinct on
the day of unification. As such, there was no legitimate basis for giving
shares or vouchers. Provision was made only for the restitution in kind.
That also caused a lot of hardships to the Treuhand.
Many cases are still pending before the courts with regard to restitution
claims. Many citizens are still claiming compensation for the property
confiscated during 1945-49, despite the fact that the role of the courts in
Germany has generally been supportive of the Treuhandanstalt and pri-
vatization. East German citizens have however been arguing that it was
not enough for the original owners to get back their property or monetary
compensation. They hoped to be compensated for the opportunities lost
during the 40 odd years of communist regime, while the West German
citizens were able to prosper under the capitalist economy and liberal
democracy.
Nor did-ihe idea of employee's shares found favour with the THA. In
many post-communist countries, employees claimed the property or the
right to manage public enterprises. In these societies, employees were
given a special share free of charge or at a nominal price. To alleviate
political pressures from the employee-voters, 'mass privatizations' or
'spontaneous privatizations' were adopted in Hungary and Poland. But it
was not found equitable in the case of East Germany. Under employees'29
shares scheme, only employees of the privatized firms could hope to
reap benefits from the windfall gains, while the diligent civil servants
could not claim the same. Secondly, employees in good firms were at an
undue advantage in comparison to those working in non-viable firms for
no fault of their own.
However, under mounting political criticism for depriving the East Ger-
mans of economic opportunities in the wake of deindustrialization as a
consequence of privatizations in East Germany, the THA adopted the
policy of Managements Buy-Outs (MBOs) and Management Buy-Ins
(MBIs) to promote East German ownership and East German entrepre-
neurship. It saved both the time and cost for the THA over negotiations,
and it seemed reasonable to handover small enterprises to former man-
agers or to THA managers who were personally interested in running
them. Approximately 20% of all cases of privatization were the cases of
MBOs. It comprised a mere 0.6% of all small and medium-sized enter-
prises (new, reprivatized and small privatization). By September 30,
1990, the THA reported 2,697 MBOs out of a total of 13,781 enterprises
which were involved in the process of privatization.
But the importance of the MBOs cannot be judged in terms of number.
According to the internal report of the Federal Ministry of Economics
published in December 1994, there were 3.2 million jobs in small and
medium-sized enterprises in East Germany and MBOs contributed to
approximately 6.7% of all the jobs in small and medium-sized enter-
prises in East Germany. According to a survey conducted by the Bonn
Institute of Mittelstandsforschung, approximately 32% of all MBOs were
industrial. In 66% of the MBOs, the purchasers were East Germans who
bought their own firms. In 14% cases, East German managers from30
other firms were brought in. The ownership of East German MBOs was
generally shared by two or more entrepreneurs, thereby undermining the
importance of employee participation. The purchasers of the firms knew
in advance that they would have to dismiss few employees. Hence they
avoided extensive participation by the employees.
The MBOs seem to have become the success story in East Germany.
By the end of 1994, only 2% of the MBOs declared bankruptcy, com-
pared to the average of 10% in otherwise newly established small and
medium-sized enterprises in East Germany. In nearly 25% of the MBOs,
profits are more than expected and every sixth MBO has already started
increasing the number of the employees they had cut previously. Many
give credit to the success of the MBOs to the generous subsidies pro-
vided to them by the THA, but it is not true. Till the end of 1994, the
MBOs had not received any credits from the consolidation fund of
DM 500 million owing to the long time taken by the new landers to evolve
the necessary regulations governing the grant of credit from this fund.
Perhaps the MBOs became successful because they bought the enter-
prise at a fairly low price. It gave them a favourable starting point.
However, the Management KGs, have not proved to be as successful as
the MBOs/MBIs. MKGs imply private limited partnerships whose general
partner is a limited liability company. Under German commercial law,
these are termed as GmbH or Co KG. Here the general partner lacks the
assets and is only liable to provide financial contributions legally needed
to create a limited liability company, the minimum being DM 50,000. A
special agency known as Beteiligungs Management Gesellschaft Berlin
(BMGB) was created on January 1, 1995 as a part of BVS to look after31
the MKGs. The THA was a minority partner with 4% shares, while 2-
3 managers formed the majority partner with 96% shares.
The MKGs were designed to be the holders of different industrial sub-
sectors which required restructuring prior to privatization. What was en-
visaged was a small number of firms to be quickly prepared for privatiza-
tion by the MKGs and not to provide huge subsidies to bad firms under
political pressures. Various firms were allotted to different MKGs. By
September 1995, these MKGs were able to secure 7,110 job guarantees
and DM 695.6 million investment guarantees. The budget of the BMGB
can provide financial support to the tune of DM 1,243 million for the pe-
riod of 1995-98. In practice, the MKGs have become the source of po-
litical sagacity to deal with the trade unions and East German politicians.
It has proved to be a political success, if not economic, by preserving the
core industries. But these may face economic crisis in the wake of over-
capacity and declining demand or vice versa.
In fact, neither restructuring nor privatization by the THA guaranteed
economic efficiency, wider choice or more competition. The THA's main
target was the continuation of business rather than the generation of
cash. Even the ex-President Birgit Breuel admitted many lapses on the
part of the THA but she also made it clear that the THA had to start the
process from a scratch, with no examples or blueprint to follow. It had to
function under very uncertain economic and political circumstances.
While some argued that there was too little support by the THA, others
argued that there was too much support. While many criticised the THA
for its 'kafka like image
1, some complained of the THA being too gener-
ous in divulging information. The Achilles heel of the THA was not a
conflict between efficiency and equity but also between privatization and32
restructuring. The THA was always criticised for giving priority to privati-
zation over restructuring by one set of economists, while others criticised
it for making tremendous losses by keeping the non-viable companies
afloat.
Verkauft und Verraten, sold and betrayed, was the basic content of the
criticisms of the THA from various quarters within Germany and outside
Germany. Since it preferred bargaining over tender, it could not be as
transparent as desired in a parliamentary democracy with a federal set
up. It was often criticised for showing favouritism towards West German
entrepreneurs and firms to the neglect of East Germans and foreigners.
Some criticised the THA for the rapid privatization. To them, it was al-
ways in super haste to privatize and did not invest enough time, money
or efforts into reviving the business enterprises in East Germany. It was
held responsible for deindustrialization and massive unemployment
causing social unrest among the people in East Germany.
To many East Germans, it paid a lip service to job security. It is surpris-
ing to note that the THA did not participate in wage-negotiations, al-
though it was directly responsible for 4 million jobs under its control. The
THA was under the obligation to create and preserve jobs. Although it
had contracted with 70,000 investors who promised approximately
1.5 million jobs and DM187bn investments, nearly 1,400 investors
failed to meet their employment targets significantly. To Horst Siebert,
economic development in East Germany was characterised by different
'time paths'. We find a 'J-curve' of adjustment in capital stock, a 'V-curve'
of adjustment in production and an 'L-curve' of adjustment in employ-
ment. The employment dropped dramatically from 10 million at the be-
ginning of 1990 to 6.4 million at the end of 1992. It has not passed the33
turning point until now. The social, economic and political costs of priva-
tization proved to be much more than anticipated.
In fact, the Treuhand had to sail between a no man's land between poli-
tics and economics. It was neither an official body nor a holding com-
pany in the strict legal terms. It could at best be compared to the Deut-
sche Bundesbank in many ways. It had very limited authority at its dis-
posal. It was financed by the Federal Ministry of Finance, co-adminis-
tered by the Management Trust whose members represented various
political parties, guided by numerous advisory committees and controlled
by the parliament through the Ministry of Finance. Under these circum-
stances, it could not achieve the optimum results.
In an 'endogenous equilibrium', it had to calculate the decisions of other
political actors and players as well. It had to calculate the likely con-
straints to be imposed by the affected parties and political lobbies. It had
to choose between 'high costs of rapid privatization' and 'high costs of
subsidization' for an indefinite period of time. It preferred low and nega-
tive selling' to 'permanent subsidies'. In this respect it proved to be a
great success.
The major goal of the THA was to create efficient property rights through
'negotiated privatization' and not through auctions or direct sales. Even
restitution to former owners was conditional on the THA's assessment of
their entrepreneurial capabilities. Under the Investment Priority Act, the
THA could allocate property rights to competent investors authoritatively
if it found the former owners unwilling or unable to invest in appropriate
business plans in lieu of compensation. In this sense, The THA did not
really sell the firms, but it bought the buyers. It functioned on the West
German model of 'collective bargaining




1, 'consensus on industrial
competitiveness' and 'welfare state provisions including codetermination
in industry and social security'. The transition from the socialist to
capitalist economy in East Germany occurred according to the functional
conditions, institutional and legal provisions and 'customary patterns of
problem solving' prevailing in West German politics. It turned out to be a
risky but a promising endeavour.
In the process of transition, the THA evolved from a central economic
agency of transformation to the most important instrument of industrial
and political policy and an important link between the federal and the
new landers. It functioned as a 'third level of cooperation' in Germany's
inter-governmental system. As such, both the Federal and Lander gov-
ernments were represented on its governing body and numerous coordi-
nating committees. It also had various representatives from industry and
trade unions. Much of the Treuhand's success depended upon this net-
work. It provided the Treuhand a plenty of scope for manoeuvring and
coping with its excessive responsibilities.
The 'interlocking' of the decision makers in the transformation process
lessened the problems of legitimacy in the case of the Treuhand. Al-
though there was a danger of being captured by the vested interests, the
cooption with the business and political groups contributed to the requi-
site checks and balances among the various political, economic and so-
cial actors, on the one hand, and provided better coordination of conflict-
ing objectives, on the other. The THA provides a classical example of
coordination and control. It linked much of the process of transformation
by relying upon the common interests of all the participations either on
the basis of the principles of rapid economic recovery or agreements35
with the trade unions or through internal guidelines. In this way it was
able to generate widest possible support for its various activities.
The THA could avoid the danger of conflict inherent in its 'dual role' as
an employer and agent of transformation only by restoring to compro-
mise, otherwise it would have been quickly torn due to the clash be-
tween the competitive forces of the federal government and new landers,
on the one hand, and the vested economic and political interest groups,
on the other. The Treuhand could survive only through the process of
mutual accommodation. The path from 'planned economy
1 to the 'market
economy
1 could not be meticulously planned itself. The Treuhand
needed a lot of autonomy and flexibility in dealing with the investors and
its networks paid rich dividends.
It was wise on the part of the Treuhand to invoke political compromise at
a time when governance through the markets or hierarchies was neither
feasible nor desirable. In the severe economic and political crisis, it was
not possible to privatize the East German firms strictly on the principles
of market economy. The Treuhand took advantage of its semi-autono-
mous, semi-bureaucratic and informal procedures. Instead of selling the
firms in the open market, it bought the concepts of private investors and
subsidized their rescue operations to the extent of negative prices.
As such, the THA came to act as a 'development agency'. The federal
structure also helped in balancing the political interests through negotia-
tions. The THA under former GDR could not have survived in the bar-
gaining democracy prevailing in the FGR. The THA also provided a
model for 'project-oriented administration' by operating in an informal,
flexible and network-like structures which go beyond the dichotomy of
public-private boundaries. The functioning of the Treuhand revealed the36
tremendous adaptative capacities of the German political and adminis-
trative system in the wake of rapid economic and political transformation.
Lessons to be Drawn
The Treuhandanstalt provides a unique example of privatization by the
state and the market. While many western countries pursued privatiza-
tion through market (auction, vouchers, mutual funds, stock market
floatations), the East German experience appears to be an exception.
Usually, state is considered an impediment, but in East Germany, the
THA, a state agency, was responsible for the restructuring of the entire
economy of the GDR within a short time. It took restructuring and privati-
zation in a situation when East Germany was undergoing a lot of prob-
lems — social, economic and political, in the wake of reunification. It was
a public agency with an Advisory Board consisting of representatives
from the federal government, state governments, commercial banks,
trade unions and major West German firms to signify the importance on
non-Germans in the privatization process. They helped in harmonizing
the various political, business, administrative and social interests.
While many marvel at the speed with which the THA was able to carry
out the privatization business in East Germany, there is no dearth of
scholars who look at the whole exercise as a simple contradiction in
terms. While some experts on privatization have argued that it would
have been better had the THA managers spent more time on each
transaction, others have suggested that some concerted efforts by the
THA towards 'de-mystifying' the agency would have smoothened the
political process, accelerating the speed thereby. The THA was also
blamed for the de-industrialization of East Germany. Perhaps it could37
have exchanged properties in West Germany for assets in East Ger-
many! Many East German nourish the feeling of being 'deprived' in their
own country. The East Germans could invest only in 6% of privatization
deals. Some have even argued that the cost of German unification would
have been less if financed by the taxes rather than borrowing. According
to Dr. Heinrich Hornef, the former agency's Financial Director, it would
take another generation to pay off the THA deficit.
The questions arise: can the Treuhandanstalt provide a model to other
East European or developing economies, on the threshold of active pri-
vatization? What lessons can we learn or unlearn from the East German
experiences in privatization? Is it advisable to entrust the privatization
job to a centralized agency or should it be left to the market? Is it good to
follow a top down approach or a bottom up approach in transitional
economies? Can the shift in ownership lead to economic efficiency?
Could the THA succeed without access to West German markets,
managerial expertise, legal framework and financial support? Can the
East German model be adopted elsewhere?
Estonia provides a rare example in Eastern Europe where a privatization
strategy similar to that of the Treuhand was adopted. In Estonia, prepri-
vatization focused on the splitting of the large enterprises into single
plant enterprises. Yet sales with more than 500 employees have been
rare and only two firms with more than 1000 employees could be privat-
ized. In the absence of well functioning state agencies, domestic and
foreign firms, the speed of restructuring is likely to be restricted in East-
ern Europe. East Germany was lucky to have a 'big brother' to solve
most of its problems in the wake of privatization which is lacked by East
European and developing countries. Although report cards are still38
pouring on the East German experiences in privatization, some impor-
tant practical lessons can be drawn :
(1) Privatization in East Germany provides a unique example of the
transformation of the entire economy. But we should not forget that
East German economy comprised only one-sixth of the West Ger-
man economy. Prior to the unification (taking the 1988 figures), East
German employees counted for just 22% of the total work force of
East and West Germany together and East Germany's disposable
income accounted for just 11% of the total German disposable in-
come. As such, it was not the entire economy, but only a large part
of unified German economy which had to be privatized. In contrast
to East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland were in a
more precarious condition.
(2) The new landers enjoyed the privileged position of being the part of
unified Germany. They had the advantage of having a 'big brother'
to guide them and support them while other post-communist socie-
ties had to adopt the policies of 'learning by doing' or 'help yourself.
East Germany almost overnight merged into the West German eco-
nomic and political system. It got ready-made legal and political in-
stitutions. The instant currency convertibility with long standing sta-
bility insulated it from hyperinflation. It had access to West German
human resources and know-how and direct access to EC markets.
The West German investors, banks and insurance companies were
<*ajso available to it for starting new business or redeveloping the old
ones. It also had the advantage of West German social security to
fall back upon. Privatization in East Germany occurred in unique
historical circumstances. As such, it just cannot be duplicated or39
copied in toto. Treuhandanstalt too was an outcome of the historic
development rather than the outcome of a well-thought out plan or
industrial policy.
(3) It is always better to have an independent institution responsible for
privatization. It can provide the necessary force, lead, speed and
credibility to the whole exercise. But every care should be taken to
insulate it from political interferences to be able to achieve the best
economic dividends. The East German experiences in privatization
clearly depict that the privatization agency could not be kept free
from the political and regional pressures now and then. It also ex-
plains the slow liquidation process in the case of non-viable enter-
prises. Liquidation makes the effects of privatization more visible
than what the politicians can actually afford.
(4) It is advisable to fix the targets of privatization in clear terms to
avoid ambiguity, delays and political controversies. A multiple target
system should have multiple means. The economic and social goals
should be clearly specified and entrusted to separate institutions as
far as possible. It can help in gaining the necessary public support
and legitimacy in a democratic framework. Conscious and system-
atic efforts must also be made to educate the public about the pros
and cons of privatization in a given socio-economic structure. Back-
door entry can prove to be counter-productive.
(5) It would be futile to locate the causes of privatization within the state
itself. The dynamics of privatization can be better understood in the
international context. Different countries may react to different
problems in different ways and the policy outcomes may have a
common appearance only by chance. There may be certain com-40
mon factors responsible for certain economic and political changes
but various countries may not interact with, learn from or induce
change in other countries. Or different countries may or may not
face similar problems yet they may try to emulate certain policies
through interactions with one another.
(6) Primarily because of the media focus and high attention paid to pri-
vatization as an instrument of economic and political management
in advanced economies, the emerging economies may also try to
emulate privatization despite having an altogether different socio-
cultural milieu. But if privatization is seen merely as a matter of
growth, economic efficiency and earning foreign exchange, to the
neglect of socio-cultural dimension, it may backfire. There is no
short cut to success. One must be prepared for hardships at present
to be able to reap benefits in future or be prepared to pay the cost
later.
(7) Undoubtedly, the scope of privatization in a given country is set by
socio-economic conditions, political culture and management exper-
tise available therein. It may be easier for those countries to reduce
the role of the state in public sector which have accorded consider-
able legitimacy to the private sector, but it may not be easy to re-
duce state intervention in those countries which have been empha-
sising the redistributive role of the state in the name of social justice.
(8) Like all economic reforms, privatization too has distributional conse-
quences. It may favour certain groups at the cost of others. As such,
it may end up shifting the 'concentration of economic power
1 per se.
In all societies, we find a nexus among power, wealth and politics. It
constitutes the political culture of a given society and the prospects41
of privatization depends substantially on this nexus. No privatization
movement is free from complacency, growth of bureaucracy and
desperate pursuit of power and control. Privatization entails not only
an economic device but also a political strategy.
(9) Privatization not only helps in generating money but it also costs
money. The East German model provides the best example. Instead
of raising DM 600 bn from the sale of public assets as expected, the
Treuhandanstalt incurred the deficit of DM 270 bn to the exchequer.
A solidarity tax of 7.5% had to be launched on January 1, 1995. It is
likely to continue in near future. The burden of the THA deficit will
have to be borne by all the taxpayers, while the gainers have been
the few. It would take another decade to bridge the gap.
(10) As such, privatization has no intrinsic value of its own. It is neither
good nor bad in itself. It is neither a 'quick fix
1 nor a 'panacea'. Nor
can it lead to economic growth and development ipso facto. On the
contrary, its 'success' or 'failure' depends upon many other factors.
At the most it can be seen as an important economic device, a po-
litical strategy or an administrative tool, but certainly not an end in
itself.42
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